The author first reviews the recently proposed Li-Hwang's biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards; then shows that the Li-Hwang's scheme has some design flaws in their scheme. In order to withstand those flaws in their scheme, an improvement of their scheme is further proposed. The author also shows that the improved scheme provides strong authentication with the use of verifying biometric, password as well as random nonces generated by the user and the server as compared to that for the Li-Hwang's scheme and other related schemes.
Introduction
In a client/server system, usually a password-based authentication scheme with smart card is widely used in order to identify the validity of a remote user [1 -3] . Traditional remote identity-based authentication schemes [4, 5] are based on passwords and thus the security of these schemes is based on the passwords only. However, simple passwords are always easy to break using simple dictionary attacks. To overcome this problem, cryptographic secret keys and passwords are used in the remote user authentication schemes. But the long and random cryptographic keys are difficult to memorise and hence they must be stored somewhere, and it makes expensive to maintain the long cryptographic keys. The problem with remote user authentication schemes using cryptographic keys and passwords is that they are unable to provide non-repudiation because of the fact that they can be forgotten, lost or even they may be shared with other people and as a result there is no way to know who is the actual user.
A biometric system is basically a pattern recognition system that operates by acquiring biometric data from an individual, extracting a feature set from the acquired data and comparing this feature set against the template set in the database [6 -8] . Biometric verification allows one to confirm or establish an individual's identity. Recently, biometric-based remote user authentication schemes along with passwords have drawn considerable attention in research [9 -11] . Some advantages of biometric keys (e.g. fingerprints, faces, irises, hand geometry and palm-prints etc.) are (as described in [10] ) † Biometric keys cannot be lost or forgotten. † Biometric keys are very difficult to copy or share. † Biometric keys are extremely hard to forge or distribute. † Biometric keys cannot be guessed easily.
† Someone's biometrics is not easy to break than others.
As a result, biometric-based remote user authentications are inherently more reliable and secure than usual traditional password-based remote user authentication schemes.
In this paper, we propose an improvement of the Li-Hwang's biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards in order to withstand their design flaws. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the Li-Hwang's biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards [10] . We then discuss the design flaws in their scheme in Section 3. In Section 4, we propose an improvement of their scheme in order to eliminate the flaws discussed in Section 3. We analyse the security of our proposed scheme in Section 5 and then compare the performances of our scheme with other related schemes in Section 6. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Review of Li-Hwang's biometric-based remote user authentication scheme
In this section, we review in brief Li-Hwang's efficient biometric-based remote user authentication scheme [10] . For describing the Li-Hwang's scheme [10] , we use the notations shown in Table 1 . Random nonce is a one-time random bitstring, usually used to achieve freshness. Random nonce helps to protect replay attacks. A one-way hash function h: {0, 1} † h can be applied to a data block of all sizes. † For any given input x, the message digest h(x) is easy to operate, enabling easy implementation in software and hardware. † The output length of h(x) is fixed. † Deriving x from the given hash value y ¼ h(x) and the given hash function h( . ) is computationally infeasible. † For any given input x, finding any other input y = x so that h( y) ¼ h(x) is computationally infeasible. † Finding a pair of inputs (x, y) with x = y, so that
The hash function is an important primitive used in many applications of cryptology and information security, notably in digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs) and other forms of authentication. It thus becomes the basis of many cryptographic algorithms.
Li-Hwang's scheme consists of the following four phases, namely registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and change password phase. Details of each phase are given in the following sub-sections.
Registration phase
Before the remote user C i logins to the system, C i needs to perform the followings. C i first enters his/her personal biometrics B i on a specific device and offers his/her password PW i , the identity ID i of C i to the registration centre, R i in person. R i then computes r i and e i as r i ¼ (PW i f i ) and
on the user's smart card and sends it to the user C i via a secure channel.
Login phase
When a user C i wants to login to the remote server S i , he/she needs to perform the following steps. C i first inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and provides his/her personal biometrics B i on a specific device to verify the user's biometrics by verifying whether h(B i ) ¼ f i or not. If this does not hold, the remote user authentication is terminated since C i does not pass the biometric verification.
On the other hand, C i inputs his/her password PW i and then after receiving C i 's password PW i the smart card does the following computations: r
where R c is a random number generated by the user. Finally, C i sends the message (ID i , M 2 ) to the remote server R i .
Authentication phase
Once the request login message (ID i , M 2 ) from the user C i is received, the remote server S i performs the following steps in order to authenticate that whether the user C i is legal or not. S i first checks whether the format of ID i of C i is valid or not. If this check is valid then only the remote server S i computes the following messages M 3 , M 4 , M 5 and M 6 in order to provide mutual authentication between C i and S i , where
After receiving the message (M 5 , M 6 ) from S i , C i verifies whether M 6 ¼ h(M 2 R c ) holds or not. If this verification passes, C i believes that S i is authenticated and computes the messages M 7 and M 8 to provide mutual authentication between S i and C i , where
. After computing the message M 8 , C i sends it to S i . Now, after receiving C i 's message, S i further verifies whether M 8 ¼ h(M 5 R s ) holds or not. If this verification does not hold, S i rejects C i 's login request. Otherwise, S i accepts C i 's login request.
Password change phase
To freely change the password PW i of a user C i to a new password PW n i , the user C i does the following steps. C i first inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and provides his/her personal biometrics B i on a specific device to verify the user's biometrics by verifying whether h(B i ) ¼ f i or not. If this verification passes, the user C i enters his/her the old password PW i and the new password PW n i . After this, the smart card performs the following operations: 3 Flaws in Li-Hwang's biometric-based remote user authentication scheme
In this section, we show that the Li-Hwang's scheme [10] has the following flaws in their design.
Flaws in login and authentication phases
We see from login phase of the Li-Hwang's scheme that the user C i first enters his/her biometric on a specific device to verify whether his/her biometric passes or not. If this verification passes, then C i enters his/her password PW i . The smart card does not verify the user's entered password in the login phase. Thus, even if user C i enters his/her password incorrectly by mistake, both the login phase and authentication phase are still continued, and finally, at the end of authentication phase, S i rejects C i 's login request. This results in causing unnecessarily extra communication and computational overheads during login and authentication phases.
In practice, any user C i keeps different passwords for different purposes. Assume that the user C i enters his/her password wrongly and let the entered password be PW
Then from login phase, we note the followings and hence
After sending the message (ID i , M 2 ) to S i , the server S i will compute M 4 and M 6 incorrectly in authentication phase, because
Because of wrong calculations in M 4 and M 6 , further computation for messages M 7 and M 8 are also incorrect as shown below.
As a result, in this case, after receiving C i 's message M 8 when S i compares M 8 with the calculated h(M 5 R s ), there will be a mismatch. Thus, S i will reject C i 's login request message.
Here the user C i is totally unaware of the fact that he/she has entered his/her password incorrectly in login phase. We thus note that if the user's password verification takes place at the very beginning of login phase, this situation will not happen and this does not result to cause unnecessarily extra communication and computational overheads during both login and authentication phases of Li-Hwang's scheme. As a result, Li-Hwang's scheme fails to provide strong authentication in both login and authentication phases due to this problem.
Flaws in password change phase
In the Li-Hwang's biometric-based remote user authentication scheme, any user C i can freely change his/her old password by the new password without contacting the registration centre R i . In their scheme, only after the successful verification of biometrics of user C i takes place, C i is allowed to enter his/ her old password PW old i and the new password PW new i . Since there is no verification of old password in their scheme, the updation of new password will take place incorrectly if the user C i enters his/her old password PW old i wrongly by mistake. We now show that due to this problem, when the user logins later in the system providing his/her biometrics as well as new password, the login request of the user is rejected by S i even if the user enters new password correctly in that time.
In order to update the new password, the Li-Hwang's scheme does the following steps after successful verification of user's biometrics. We assume that the user C i enters his/ her old password PW old i incorrectly so that PW i = PW old i . We then have
, and
As a result, we have the following
The smart card will replace e i with e ′′ i into its memory. Hence, in such scenario the new password of the user is not correctly updated in the smart card. As a consequence, when the same user will login later in the system providing his/her own biometrics and new changed password PW new i , after the successful verification of user's biometrics the login request message of the user is always rejected by the server S i even if the user enters the correct new password in that time. This effect will continue in subsequent password change phases by that user. To overcome such serious problem, the user will not have other options except to issue another new smart card providing the necessary information such as his/ her fresh identity, biometrics and password securely to the registration centre R i .
Flaws in verification of biometrics using hash function
One of the fundamental properties of a secure one-way hash function is that the outputs are very sensitive to small perturbations in their inputs. The cryptographic hash function cannot be applied straightforwardly when the input data are with noisy such as biometrics [6 -8, 13] .
In registration phase of Li-Hwang's scheme, the registration centre R i computes f i ¼ h(B i ) based on the user's personal biometric pattern B i . Thereupon, f i is stored in the smart card for purpose of authentication. However, the authentication procedure may result in serious flaws because h(B i ) ¼ f i may never succeed, since the biometric patterns belonging to the same person may differ slightly from time to time, for example fingerprint and voiceprint. Thus, when the user's entered personal biometric pattern differs even slightly from that submitted to the registration centre, the condition h(B i ) ¼ f i may never succeed due to sensitive fundamental property of the one-way hash function h( . ). As a result, this may cause the legal user unable to pass biometric verification at the login phase and password change phase of Li-Hwang's scheme.
Improved biometric-based remote user authentication scheme
In this section, we propose an improvement of the Li-Hwang's biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards in order to withstand the flaws discussed in Section 3. We use the same notations used as in the Li-Hwang's scheme shown in Table 1 . In order to overcome serious problem in using the one-way hash function h( . ) for personal biomteric template verification as in Li-Hwang's scheme (discussed in Section 3.3), we use the biometric template pattern matching in order to perform the user's biometric verification [6] . For this purpose, the user's biometric template pattern will be stored in the system and when the user inputs his/her biometric template, it will be matched against the template stored in the system. If there is a match, then the user will pass his/her biometric verification.
Our improved approach consists of the following phases.
Registration phase
In order to login to the system, the remote user C i needs to perform the following stages, as shown in Fig. 1 .
Step 1: The user inputs his/her personal biometric B i on a specific device and offers his/her password PW i and the identity ID i of the user to the registration centre R i in person.
Step 2: The registration centre R i then computes the followings
Here X s is a secret information generated by the server. We note that X s and passwords of the corresponding users are not disclosed to any others for all secure future communications.
Step 3: Finally, the registration centre R i loads (ID i , h( . ), f i , e i , r i ) on the user's smart card and sends these information to the user C i via a secure channel.
We note that in our scheme, the extra information r i is stored in the user's smart card compared with the Li-Hwang's scheme.
Login phase
In this phase, if a user C i wants to login to the server S i , he/she needs to perform the following steps, as shown in Fig. 2. Step 1: C i first inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader of a terminal and offers his/her personal biometric template, B i on the specific device to verify his/her biometric.
Step 2: Next, the user's personal biometric template B i is matched against the template stored in the system.
Step 3: If the above verification does not hold, then C i does not pass the biometric verification and as a result, the remote user authentication is terminated. Otherwise, on the other hand, if the above mentioned verification holds, C i passes the biometric verification and C i then inputs his/her password PW i to perform the following step 4.
Step 4: The smart card computes r Step 5: If r ′ i = r i , the smart card computes the followings:
where R c is a random number generated by the user.
We note that R c is masked with the hash of the secret value h(ID i X s ).
Step 6: Finally, C i sends the message kID i , M 2 , M 3 l to the remote server S i .
It is noted that the hash value of R c is transmitted in plaintext. Owing to the properties of the one-way hash function, it is difficult to retrieve R c by an attacker eavesdropping the message kID i , M 2 , M 3 l sent by C i to S i .
Authentication phase
After receiving the login request message kID i , M 2 , M 3 l, S i performs the following steps, as shown in Fig. 3 , in order to authenticate that whether the user C i is legal or not.
Step 1: S i first checks the format of C i 's ID i .
Step 2: If the above format is valid, S i then computes the following:
M 4 ¼ h(ID i X s ) using the secret value maintained by the server. Fig. 1 Registration phase of our proposed scheme 
In order to resist the replay attacks and the man-in-the-middle attacks, S i can store the values (ID i , M 5 ) in its database, where M 5 ¼ R c . Thus, when S i receives next message, say l is a replay message and the server S i simply discards that message. Otherwise, S i confirms that the message is not a replay message and it is a fresh one. In this case, the server S i will replace M 5 with the computed M ′ 5 in its database.
Step 3: S i then sends the message kM 7 , M 6 , M 8 l to C i .
Step 4: After receiving the message in step 3, C i verifies whether
. Thus, if the verification does not pass, C i terminates the session. Otherwise, C i proceeds as follows by computing M 9 ¼ M 6 ⊕ M 1 (¼ R s ) and verifying further whether h(M 9 ) ¼ M 8 ? If h(M 9 ) = M 8 , C i terminates the session. On the other hand, C i computes
) and sends the message kM 10 l to the server S i .
Step 5: After receiving C i 's message, S i verifies whether
Step 6: If the above mentioned does not hold, S i rejects C i 's login request.
Step 7: In case the verification is successful, then only S i accepts C i 's login request.
Remark: We note that the mutual authentication between S i and C i is achieved by means of attaching random value R c by the client and the random value R s by the server. It is also clear to note that our proposed improved scheme provides strong authentication based on three things: biometric template verification, password verification and mutual authentication between user and server. Further, use of random nonce helps to resist the replay attacks.
Password change phase
We see from the Li-Hwang's scheme that a user can freely change his/her password locally without contacting the remote server. In their scheme, only after the biometric template verification, even if the user enters by mistake his/ her old password wrongly the value of e i is still updated, which is incorrect. Thus, in next time when user wants to login in the system, the user's login request will be rejected by the server even if the user enters in that time his/her new changed password correctly.
In this phase, we show that in our scheme the abovementioned situation will never happen because the smart card always verifies the old entered password by the user before updating the new changed password. The password change phase has the following steps.
Step 1: Inserts the smart card and offers B i .
Step 2: Verifies whether the user's personal biometric template B i matches against the template stored in the system. Step 4: The smart card then computes the following
If r ′ i = r i , it means that C i enters his/her old password incorrectly and the password change phase is terminated.
If r ′ i = r i , then only smart card computes
Step 5: Finally, replace the e i with e ′′ i and r i with r ′′ i on the smart card.
We thus note that in our improved scheme not only the value of e i is replaced by the value of e ′′ i , but also the value of r i is replaced by the value of r ′′ i in the smart card as compared with Li-Hwang's scheme. 5 Security analysis of the improved scheme
In this section, we analyse the security of our proposed scheme. The security analysis of our scheme is similar to that in the Li-Hwang's scheme [10] . † As in Li-Hwang's scheme [10] , the remote server only has to maintain secret information X s in our scheme also, without storing the passwords tables of users. An attacker may try to derive X s from the intercepted messages, namely kID i , M 2 , M 3 l during the login phase, and kM 7 , M 6 , M 8 l and kM 10 l during the authentication phase. However, it is a computationally infeasible problem due to the property of one-way hash function and the hash value of random values. † One attack may be that an illegal user can intercept the message kID i , M 2 , M 3 l from C i and try to masquerade as the remote server. As in Li-Hwang's scheme [10] , it is impossible for the illegal user to compute the message M 7 in order to convince C i unless he/she knows the secret information X s . Again, the server does not store all random values ever sent by the client C i .
† As in Li-Hwang's scheme [10] , the server does not store all random values ever sent by the client and thus parallel session attack is also completely solved in our improved scheme by generating the random number between user and remote server. † Assume that a legal user lost his/her smart card. As pointed out in Li-Hwang's scheme [10] , storing secret information on the smart card is as secure as the password. Now, for any attacker it is difficult to derive or change the password because the attacker has to pass the biometric verification. However, the attacker is unable to pass the biometric verification due to the properties of the biometrics, because there will be a mismatch between the attacker's biometric template and the biometric template stored in the system of the original user. Moreover, in our scheme for changing the password the attacker has to pass the old password verification. Thus, the attacker has to guess the old password before updating the new password chosen by him/her. † Suppose an illegal user may try to fabricate fake login request messages to cheat the remote server in order to convince the remote server that it is a legal remote login request in the login phase. This attack is known as masquerade attack. We note that the user sends the message kID i , M 2 , M 3 l to the remote server, where
In order to convince the remote server that it is a legal remote login request, the illegal user has to modify M 2 and M 3 correctly. Now, to modify M 2 and M 3 , he/she has to know M 1 and the random nonce R c . Even if the illegal user intercepts the message kID i , M 2 , M 3 l and modifies the message
where R x is a random number chosen by that user, he/she still is unable to compute h(R c ⊕ R x ), because R c is not known to that user. As a result, the fake user is unable to compute the message M 10 in order to convince the remote user unless he/she knows C i 's random nonce R c . However, it is a computationally infeasible problem due to properties of one-way hash function h( . ).
Performances comparison with related schemes
In this section, we compare the performances of our improved scheme with those for Lin-Lai's scheme [11] , Lee-Chiu's scheme [5] [9] and Li-Hwang's scheme [10] .
Performance comparison of our improved scheme with other related schemes is shown in Table 2 . In terms of efficiency, the exponential operations are very high-powered and time-consuming. From this table, we see that Lin-Lai scheme [11] and Lee-Chiu scheme [5] require some exponential operations because the security of those schemes is based on solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Owing to very efficiency of one-way hash function h( . ), the computational costs are very low in our scheme, Yoon et al. scheme [14] , Chang et al. scheme [15] , Khan et al. scheme [9] and Li-Hwang scheme [10] . As a result, our scheme is also efficient in computation due to few hash function operations.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an improvement of the Li-Hwang's efficient biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards in order to withstand flaws in their scheme. The proposed improved scheme achieves good properties such as without synchronised clock, freely changes password, low computation costs and mutual authentication. Beside these properties, the proposed scheme also provides nonrepudiation because of the characteristics of personal biometrics as in the Li-Hwang's scheme. Our proposed scheme provides strong authentication with the help of verifying biometrics, passwords and random nonces generated by the user and server as compared to that for the Li-Hwang's scheme. 
